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ABSTRACT

Environmental factors whioh bave lmp.ded actirlty In
the Arcttc, in the past, remain slgnlrtcant barriers to the
development or the Northwest Passage.

Consequ.ntly,

enormous oapital as well •• bilateral planning and cooperatton between United States and CanadIan publio and private
agencies .111 be required if significant

pro~e88

18 to be

achieved.
The re.ource wealth of the Arctic proml••s the eeonomlc
inoentives es.enttal to the

even~lal

development or a tran.-

portatlon system to permit explo'tatfon

or

theae re.ources.

1.'he economtc potential or Alaakan 01.1 motivated the Arcttc
tanker test or the S.S. Manhattan, an alMost purely private
venture.

Thl. teat demonstrated the engineerins feasibIlity

of penetrating an ••••nti.lly ice-covered deep water thoroughfare, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, .1th larp'e
commeroial surrace ves8els.

Establt.hlng economic feasI-

bility will be lIlUoh more difficult.
Development or a commercially rea8fble Northwest PassaR.
1. both eoonomioally and strategically desirable.

How8ver,

imm8nse physical and eng1neerlng problems rema1n to be
solved.

Tn addition to severe envIronmental challenpes and

the requi'reftlent t"or large public and pri vat. capt tal co","1 tment t9 the need for operable pollution control procedures
11

to proteot the delicate Arctic ecology.

Pbrthermo~.,

sensitive legal and politteal problema need to be .atts-

raetor1ly resolved.

All thea. factors

8u~~e.t

the early

formulation or a bilateral planning and coordlnat'on
"Council" to resolve mutual proble.a and optimize limited
resources.

ltl
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CHAPTER I

IJIlTRODUCTrOtf
In 1968 the private oil industry of the United States
discovered crude 011 deposits on the North Slope or Alaska
believed to be the larp,est all field deposit tn North
America.

Lying entirely within the harsh environment be-

yond the Aretlc Circle this area has been essentially
Inaeeesslble except by air.
eost or

developin~

The difficulties and potential

a transportation system necessitated

extenslve investigation into competitIve methods of transportlnF thl. otl to eastern United States' markets.
One method considered potentially feaatble was by larFe
lee-breaking tanker through the historically difficult and
inhospitable Northwest
~r.ater

Pa88a~e.

Tht. method promised

economies than a trans-Canadian-United Stetes pipe-

lIne .hloh poses unique and expensive probleMS.

Aecord-

tnpt,., an operat10nal test '.nvolvlng an tee-breaker tanker
was considered e8sential 1n order to establish the eeonomic
feaslbility of developinp, a year-round tanker operation.
The S.8. Manhattan successrully transited the Nopthwest Pa••ape in both direotions between 24 August and 14
November 1969.
'

.

The tranal t focused internat10nal attentt OD

on the key locatIon or the Arettc as a trade route for
internatIonal commerce and attmulated an awareness or the
1

implioit potential for the exploitatIon of the vast mIneral
resouroe.

01'

the Canadian Arctic.

Concurrently. l.portant and complex questions of'
natIonal and international slgnifioanoe were raised.
the purpose of this
slpnlfioanoe In

stu~

It Is

to examine the transit. Ita

pioneerln~

an eoonomically teasible 9ystem

for the exploitation of Arotio resouroes and the inherent
national and internattonal eoonomic,

le~al-polltical

and

strategio implications In the eventual development of. an
international route for surface maritime oommeroe.

This

venture generated an unusual number or periodical articles
and publio speculations of varying degrees or us.rulness.
Because or oonstraints or apace many detail. bave neoessarily been ellmtnated In favor of a broad examination of the
complex problem. involved.
An apolop:y must be ofrered f"or the two charta included
at Appendix T.

They are the only one. readIly avallabl.

through the grapbio art. divIsion of the Naval War College
without r ••ortinF to expensive photographic reduction.
Whil. inadequate in detsil they do suftice to generally
orient the reader.

2

CHAPTER TI

FACTORS nICH RAVE LIMITED DEVRLOPMFtf'1'

Historical Analysis.
north". 1

"!he near route to the Far East Is

Ouided by this maxim and motivated by the riches

of the ortent neorly every probe or the Arcttc or subArctic up to the 18th Century w.s financed by merchants.
These men, lIke the sponsors of the Manhattan test, were
primarily interested in the potential profits promised by
the establishment of shorter trade routes.

The extreme

rigors encountered by the early voyagers convinced

~lropean

merchants that even if' a Morthwest Passage existed and
could be successfully negot1.a.ted the route

W88

too hazard-

ous to be economical.
R.tions tnterested In overaeas expansion and the
Canadian fur trade continued to
the 18th

C~ntury.

encoura~.

voyages

tbrou~h

These excursions provided the stimulus

for systematic study by increasIng numbers of scientists
and geographers Who helped map the Arctic Islands.
'fhe cha11eng8 of conqutltr1ng the lce and the search for

knowledpe oontinued to motivate expedlt10ns throup,h the
19th Century.
1

It was not until the beg1nntn,.

or

the

~Oth

Vl1hjalmur Stefansaon, Worth.eat to FOrtune, (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pieroe, 1958), p. 46.

Century, In 1906, that the

Rorw~~lan

explorer Roald Amundsen

climaxed four centuries or exploratt on by suceeas fully
1

•

navigating the passape during 8 three-year voyage In the 47
ton herring sloop Ojoa. 2 Even this hi8tor~c voyage was of
minor praotical signifioanoe because the route he followed
skirts the continental land mass, Is studded with islands
and shoals and 18 limited 1n places to depths of 5-6 fathoms.
The route followed b,. the Manhattan (See Chart I,
Appendix T) was first negotiated by

8

deep draft vessel,

the Canadian Ice-breaker Labrador, In 1954.

called

ThIs route,

Parry Channel, divides the Canadian Arctic

~he

Ielands and is the onl,. navigable route for deep draft
vesse18.

It 1s divided at its western end by Banks Island

where the relattve1,. narrow Prince or Wales Strait passes
to the south.

or
W8S

the more

The first vessel to transit the

dtfrl~llt

lenpth

~ntire

McClure Strait north of Banks Island

the USCG tce-breaker Northwlnd.

The UBS Seadrsgon

extensively Bounded Parry Channel and MoClure Strait

durtn~

s submerged transit in 1960. 3

Perttnent Features

or

the Region.

The main Canadian

Arctic Islands are 500.000 square miles in area Rnd 11e
2Frneet S. Dodge, Northwest bZ Sea, (New York: Ox~ord,
Oxrord Untv. Press, 1911), for chronological history.
30eorge P. Ste~le, SEADRAGON North.est Under the Ice,
(New York: Dutton 1962), p. 185-188.
4

entirely within the Arotlc olimatic region. 4

As prevtou8ly

noted theae tslands are divided into two prIncipal pal'te by

the Parry Channel.

The waters of the 81"8a 8re covered by a

mantle of sea ice for at 1.8.t seven months of the year.
Initial freeze-up occurs In all the ooast81 waters by mid
September and the Fenersl break-up and d18onar,e

or

the Ice

In the eastern end does not take place before late June or
early July.

Break-Up begIns In ar••• of weak lee coneen-

tratt on and expand. outward rrom these centers dur' ng the
summer.

Unl1ke the polar pack there 18 little movement of

10e during the winter and very irregular drlft 1n summer.
The circulation through thie .ystem Is weak and appears to
be Inrluenced by the circulatory systems or the Arcttc

Ocean, Bafftn Bay and Hudson Strait.

The dominant mov8ment

of "ater 18 eaeterly through the Borrow Stratt--Lanoaster
Sound passage.

The Parry Ohannel .ystem

~orm.

a transitIon

zone between the .at8rl to the west, oharaoteristic of the
Polar Basin, and tho.e to the e6at tha tare f'ormed throu¢t
an 1ntftrohange

or Arcttc

"ater w1.th that

land current In Baffin Bay.S

5

or

the west Oreen-

At its minimum, durIng the third quarter of the year,
the ice reoedes up to Point Barrow and above, and open
water oould be encountered anywhere along a route from the
Atlantic throup'.h Parry Channel and on to Point Barrow.

Tn

practioe, however, Bny continuous transit would encounter
substantial movlnR 10e even during this minImum 10e period.
The maximum thickness of annual plate lee over the
route is 6-7 teet and the maximum thiokness of multi-year
10e 18 about ten feet.

The heaviest or thickest ice occurs

during the April through May period prior to start of the
melt season.

At the maximum lee period, 10e

or 20

rld~es

foot depths or greater, rormed by deformation of ice, could

eover 15-25 percent of the 8urrace In 80me are.8.

WhIle

little is known conoerning these rldFea, ava11able evidenoe
indIcates that the underwater portion, 4/5 of the total
ridge depth, has a strength of about 30 peroent of the surfaoe 10e.

While the majority of the r1dp:es alonp the route

are in the ranFe of 30-foot depth, ooeaslonal ridFes up to
100 feet deep may be enoountered.

The deeper

reoognized and partially avoided in order to
time.
ous

rld~e8

.pe~d

may be

transit

Bowever, 1 t 1 s elear that any vessel making continu-

pro~reB8 throu~h

the passaF.e must be capable of

negotiatin~ ice ridges, sametime. in rapid Bucces81on. 6
6

Walter I. Wittman, Head Sea Ioe Branch, Nav7 Ooeanographic Orrice, Unpublished Planning Data for Arctic Tanker
Test,dated 6 Dec. 1968.
6

The system of Channels bp,tween the Arettc Islands
presents a d1stInet1y difrerent picture than the polar 10e
pock which is continuouslY' in motton.

The larger straits

wIll not freeze over entirely, but w111 be oloPFed by heavy
drirt 10e

~om

the Arct10 Ocean.

Because or the physicsl

oonstraints Imposed by shoreB.nes, tremendous forces are
exerted by wind and current.

Ice scientists are now oon-

vineed that there Is little question of the ability of
larFe vessels to "crack" lee up to 100 feet thiok.

Sowever,

more reaearch is required into the dynamios of 10e movements,
both the tremendous pressurea induced by wind and current
and the magnItude of foroe required to 'Move lee aslde enee
It is broken.
An immensely expanded program of engineering researoh
wIll be required 1.n the next several years.
lar~e

Problems of

ship struotural requirements, power requIrements,

least hasardou8 and moat economic routings, mooring requlrementa and pollutIon hazards must all ba studIed.
suoh

88

the neWly expanded Naval Arettc

R~a~arch

ActivIties
Laboratory

(NARL) at Pt. Barrow, Alaaka and the Army Cold ReFton.
Resenrch and EngIneering Laboratory at Hanover, N.H •• wIll

assume increased importanoe In such a proF,rem.

7

CHAPTER TII
MANBATTAtf TRANSIT OF 'ME PASSAGE

Planning Oonsiderattona.

The Prudhoe Bay discovery

was made at an opportune time.

Oil produotion in the

continental United States wIll peak In the early 1970's
and then begin to decltne.

On the basia or the needs of

the United States eoonomy and the potential of the north
slope plans are being made for a total flow of two million
barrel. per day by 1980.

The bulk of this flow 1Ift1st move

to the 011 defioient eastern United Statea in same eoonomic
manner and begin doing

80

by 197?

Alternatives

oon.lder~d

inoluded a pipeline acrOS8 Panama and movement by Nuclear
Submarine Tankers.

The choIce narrowed down to a pipeline

across the northePn part or North Amerl ca or tankers
through the Korth.e.t Passage. 1

aoo

The deciston to build an

m\Ie trans-Alaska pipeline s1stem ('1'APS) f'rom Prudhoe

Bay to the Ice free port of Valdez was made in February

1969. 2

However, this multiple user raoility wIll carry oil

to the western United States and ha. Itttle or no erreat on
a decision concerning movement to the eaat coast.

Because

1

-The 011 and the Ioe". Varine Enpineering/Log •
• ov8mb8~ 1969. p. 66.
SLee Corkill. "Pipeline Across Alaska", The Rumble Wax.
Third Quarter 1969, p. 23.

e

of the complex problema or oonstruction In permafrost, cost
est~ate8

oontinue to e8calate and this project faoes

serious enfl!.neering and polItical problems.
Nuclear submarIne tankers wh!.ch would move 011 under
the

lc~

have not been discarded as an eventual possibility.

Such .. 8ystem would elimInate some

or

the problema

ot sur-

faoe transportation and, in spite of' its cost, oould conceivably become competitive with projeoted pIpeline syetems. 3
However, one or the principal problems 18 the unoertalnty
of providtng an operational system In the time rrame required.
The primary factor favoring a surrace marine .yet_ was

an •• timated 40¢--60¢ per barrel cost saving.

Industry

planners estimated that at planned production levels through
1980 the value of tuture savings over a 20-year project life

.as about .1.2 billion after tax.

AssumIng t.st costs

oou1d be written off over a two-year perIod the value ratio

or

potential benefits to cost .as estimated to be about

140/1."
Models of a "Wind" 01a88, Dest~ ¥-13, and Manhattan
ice-breaker tanker were evaluated at the navy model toe test
tanka of the U.S. Wavy Undereea Warfare lab in San 01.e,,0,

SftThe Oil and the Ioe", p. 71 and "Nuclear Subs UrFed.
to Move Alaskan Oil", Providenoe Journal, 17 Deo. 1969, p. 2~
·Stanley B. Haae, Unpublished Arctic Tanker T~et Planning
Memorandum, dated 6 Dec. 1988.
\)

Oal1 r.

One-twent!,eth (1/20) scale model. of' "WYNn" 01as8

and "super tanker" (250,000 ton) lee breakers were tested
ln natural 10e on a fre8h water lake ln tM S.18. Alp. at
Orenob1e, Franoe.

Theee model tests correlated well with

oomputer studies based on U.S. Coast Guard

ea1~11ationa

and indioated that the plate ioe anticipated would represent no serious obstacle for a 250,000 DWT ioe-breaker
tanker wIth a power plant of 60,000 SRP or larger.
an operational test

W8.

However,

oonsidered e.sential to verlfy the

validity or math and model test IndtoRtlons. 5
~eot

Support.

Once the dect8ion . .s made to prooeed

with an operational test it became necessary to solicit the
assistance or the U.S. Raval Ooeanographio orrice, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (United States Coast Guard)
and the Canadian Department

or Transportat10n

(M.teorolo"ical

Branch) to prov1.de the environmental data required.

These

ap8noi.8 represented the prlno1pa1 unique expertise available on ice conditIons, 8ea lee behav1or. 10e roreoa.ting,
ice physics, remote sensors and

Ima£8~y

interpretation.

Additionally each of thes. agencies waa requested to 8upp1y
"such support asalatanee as th~ ml~t be able to render."e
5 "The Great Arottc Gamble". Surveyor, Au,uat 1969, p. 6.

6Letter from Chairman or the Board, Rumble 011 and
Refining Co. to Secretary of the Navy dated 20 February 1989.

10

While no federal subsidies were provided the•• agencies
contributed vary.1ng degrees or support.

The NBval Oceano-

graphIc ofrice provIded environmental data for pre-test
plannIng, instructIon In lee condItIons for ke7 crfllw members,
diverted regularly soheduled ice reconnalssanoe flights for
pre-teat ooverage of the route and provided an on-board
imagery Interpreter during the transIt.

The United State8

Coast Guard provIded an lee-breaker escort (whIch wa8 forced
to wI thdraw due to an engineoaaual ty), a CaptaIn wI th
loe-breaker experience a8 on-board oblerver for the trsnsit
and 80me on-Icene .1ee reconnalsRsnce fllRhts.
RegIons Research and

En~tneer1ng

le8 scientists for the teet.

Armyts Cold

Laboratory provided several

The Canadian Department of

Tran8portation provIded an toe-breaker escort, an experIenoed lee Captain

8S

observer, on-8cene ice reconD.iBsanoe

throughout the transit and loe

observtn~

and forecasting

support through lee foreoast Central at Halifax, lova Sootia.
Test Vehicle and ObjectIves.

The Manhattan was seleoted

for thIs test because she was the largest, newest and most
heaVily constructed 1n the UnIted States flag fleet.

With

twin sorews and 43,000 SHP she wes by far the most powerful
commercial veBsel available.
service by
hBS

~lve

Her conversIon for loe-breaking

separate shipyards from Matne to Mississippi.

been extenst ve17 reported 1n per!. odt calliterature. This

"crash" project. con81sted of at'Jding an 10ft-breaking bow, a
11

slopinR ice belt along the hull, machinePi 0011181.on chocks,
hull strengthening around the engtne room, specially
deslpned serews 22 feet 1n diameter, new tail shafts,
general internal hull strengthening and proteotive shielding
for the rudders.

At one time 10,000 shipyard personnel were

working on the project.

A total of

~.5

million man hours

were expended.

Enough additional steel was placed 'n the
ship to build a 50,000 otT tanker. 7 Thi. projeot 18 indeed

a tribute to the effeotiveness of industry planning and
coordination.
The replacement or the existing bow by a newly
construoted 65 foot ioe-breaker bow construoted on the
"M.!.T." or "White" principle warrants rurther comment.
This new shape has it. origin In a dootoral study oompleted
at M.l.T. 1n 1965 by Roderick M. White, who 1s now Ohief of
the Applied Engineering Section of the USCG Aoademy.

The

new bow, shaped like a giant soimitar, moves the vessel
into the ice at an 18 degree angle before increasing to the
more oonventional 30 degrees.
F,lves 8

lar~e

The shallow forward

sustained roroo on the toe durIng ramming,

while 8 relatively small peak load is

~xerted

After the bow hes ridden up on the 10e, the
7

an~le

nThe 011 and the Ice", p. 66.
12

on the ship.

l8r~er

angle

makes it less difficult to back out.

Previou8 to White,

the 01aesl0 work on the mathematics of ramming was that of
a Russian, I.V. V1nogradov 1n 1946. 8 ThSs bow reportedly
functtoned verry ef:reottvel,. and .tll probably be the design
employed in any new construction ice-breaker tanker.
Init!al planning for the operattonal phase wae predicated on oompletion of sh1p oonversion by earl,. Ma,. In
order to enter Parry Channel about 1 June.

Thie might have

permitted the colleotton ot adequate data in heavy ice to
4

~

preclude

8

return i.n 1970 to accaapllsh test obj eet!. vee.

In addition to establlshlng major design parameters for a
ftrst generation

or

toe-breakIng tankerl apec1ftc test

objectives included the establtshment of:
- optimum speed-horsepower oombinattons through uniform lee thickneBS.

- vess.l performance through ridge
oondl ti one.

- forces, accelerattons, mottons
and impact loads on vess8l In
varIous lce oonditions.
- the maneuvering oapab!lity of ~.
long parallel hull tanker fora. 9

Phlstcal Description
oated

prevl~18l1

or

the Northwes' Pas sase. As indi-

the route followed by Manhattan provides

8_ I oe Crusher for the Northwest Passage", T&chnoloSl
ReView, October-November 1969, p. 70-71.
9Raas , "Plann\ng Memorendu.". 6 D8cember 1968.

1&

the only practioal deep draft thoroughfare oonnecting the
Atlantic and Pacific

tbrou~b

the CanadIan Arctto Islands.

In order to gain a better understanding of the operational
problem and later d1scus81ona of leg.l--politioal oonslderations an examination

or this

route In some detail 1s

warranted.
Keeping close to the west aoast of Greenland to take
advantage of the relatively ioe-tree .aters here during the
summer montha the route passes through Davis Strait, discovered by John Davia 1n 1585.

Trans1ting asrtln Bay,

Which was first saIled by William Beffln in 1616, the route
enters Lanoaster Sound, a180 looated by Baftin, whIch is
the aotual entrance to the Horthwe.t

Pas8a~e.

Laneaster sound Is a wide strait of at least 35 mt1.s
unt1.1 it reaches Prince Leopold Island where it narrows to
about 25 miles.

Barrow StraIt, one of the four straits

forming Parry Channel, 18 the only one with a small group
of islands in the middle; this strait 1. narrowed to about
15 mile. by the presence of Young Island on the south and
Lowther lsland on the north.

The route then wIdens through

Viscount Melville Sound to more than 75 ml1ea before reaohing MoClure Strait.
el,~t

Edward Parry, in 1819, reached within

of Banke Island, whlch dtvide. McClure and Prince of

Walee StraIts, before being stopped by the ioe.
Navigatton oonditions are generally more favorable along

14

the eastern half of the route and deteriorate when approachIng MoC1ure Strait which generally remains cnoked, with lce,

driven by the wind, trom the Beaufort Sea.

The PrInce ot

W.1es Strait to the southweat Is generally 1es8 difficult,
being protected tram the Ice by Banka Island.

The northern

entrance of this strait is just over 11 mile. wide and
narrows slightly until d1v'ded In half by Prince Royal
Tsland, leaVing a passage of fIve miles on either aide.

Only the southem passage 1a sare1y navigable

due to 11m1t-

tng depths of two fathoms in the Channel north of' Prince

ROJ'.l Island. 1O '!'he 1"oute then widens to Its 8outhe:rn
entrance whloh 1. 25 mIl•• aero•• and paa.es into Amundsen
Gulf, whioh 18 over 50 mile. wide.

'l'he route then proceeds

along the mainland coast where 10e oonditions are generally
dependent on the wind and 10e movements 1n the Beaufort Sea. 11

When Manhattan arrived at Banks Island, Prince of Wales
Strait waa near17 free of lee and since there was time
avatlable 1n the schedule, a probe ot MoC1ure Strait wa.
attempted In order to gather data in more difficult lee.

Here the ship became entrapped within an eight mile floe for
10
Canad1.an H7dro@raphic S8r'vtce Cha!'t #7091, Prince of'
Wa1ee and McClure Strait, Ju1J' 12, 1963, Scale 1:500,000.
11 A. Donat Pharand, "Innocent Passage in the Arctic",
The Canadian Yearbook of Intel"natlonal Law 1968, p. 50.
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nearly two day. and .a. oarrled 2-S miles before being
h'eed.

Thill dela,. nece8sitated a return to 1T1nce

or Wa18.

Strait In order to insure meeting 8cheduled oommitments at
Prudhoe Bay, although the trip through Prince of Wales
Strait Is 350 mtl•• lon"er than through the more northerly
McClure Strait.

Experlenoed observers aboard are conv1,noftd

thet WoClure Strait could have been Bucces.tully negotiated
by avoiding the larger tce floes. 12
Evaluation of Transit.

In terms of test objective. the

transit must be considered sucoessrul.

A tremendous amount

of data was obtained whioh 18 still being evaluated.

Th.

ship performed very .ell and was more maneuverable tban
anticipated.

St.ering control w.a maintained In the ic.

and ship oontrol was Fenerally good.

The Fr•• test poten-

tIal d.n~er i8 beooming "locked In" within a large floe and

being carried

.~ound.

tndulltry repr•••nt.tiv~8 believe

that with an additional 25 peroent more power the Manhattan
1
would not have beoome "looked In" even in "CC1UN Stra1t. &

The ship sustained a hole in the bull or 15

by

30 feet, ~16

feet art of the bow, on the starboard aIde and below the

12

F.A. Goettel, Senior U.S. Coast Guard Ob8erYer, Tele-

phone Interview, S Deoember 1969.

lST.J. ~son. General Manager Humble Marine Operationa,
Brtefing to Naval Officera, Pentagon, 5 November 1969.
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lee belt.

While industry offioials caution against drawing

any conclusion. trom this it does help to substantiate

8

requirement for double hull construction in tankers designed
for Arctic .ervice 1n order to reduce pollution rieks.

Data of a teohnical, or even semi-technical nature,
that hasn't been released to the publIc throup:h the variou8
media, is being oonsidered proprietary.

Industrr sponsors

of the test are hopeful that the data gathered and its
application to the design of a new, large ioe-breaking
tanker will plece them in a competitive position warranting
the high researoh expenditures. 1•
Most observers are cautiousll optimistic.

They believe

• year-round operation is feasible provided suffioient capital i8 oommitted to

Oonst~10t

the large powerfUl vessels

required and the support facilt ties whioh 1'111 be essential.
Establtshing economto feasibility is a more difficult
proposition.

One 10e scientist, who made th8 transit, i .

convinced that 10e charaoteristics during the more diffIcult
February--March per10d are suff1elentl1 dlrrerent to warrant
further testing under these conditIons before a deciston
can be made. 15

Others believe tbat Apr11-_May oonstitutes

14~.J. PUson, Humble, Personal Oorrespondence dated 29
September, 1989.

15auenther E. Frankenstein, Res.aroh Civil Engineer,
U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory,
Pre.entation at Unlv. of Rhode Ia1and. 8 Dec. 1969.
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the mOlt dirficult period.

While weather oonditions have

moderated by this time lce cont1.nues to "grow" Into May.
Extensive 10e r-econnatssanoe and evaluat1.on
the .ervices

or ice-breaking

any year-round operation.
provAd adequate

1"01"

the extended hours

8S

well as

escorts wIll be essential to

While the use of floodllF.hts

ship oontrol during hours of darkness

or

diminished natural illumination dur1ng

the wtnter months may ser1oo811 hamper adequate ioe reoonnalssanee during that sea80n.
It 18 widely oonoeded that

AU~lBt--September provide.

the least dirficult condtt1ons.

Conaequentl1. the extent

to which a transit during this per10d aotually demonstrated
userul evidence of year-round f'easlb11ity 18 ser10usly
questioned.
IndustJ"7 officials are ourrently planning to conduot
fUrther tests in May.

Indications are that theBe tests will

be oonduoted in Bafnn Bay in the vioini ty of Bylot Island
Bnd that no penetratt on further west than Resolute will be

attempted.

Such a teat 18 oonsidered by lee soientists aa

unlikely to produoe more oonolustve evidence than that
already accumulated.
Without detraoting from the operational aohievement it
1. d\ftioult to ignore the fact that. aside from a modest

engineerinF advanoement in tee-breaking techniques, this
tranltt could have been performed
18

8

decade or more ago, from

a purely technological point of view, had the economic

inoentlves existed.
One or the most difficult problems facing planners In
the

d.velopm~nt

or

any Arcttc transportation system .111 be

the recruitment, training, motivation and retention
qualified personnel.
to be particularly
envIronment.

Motivation and retentton could prove

troub1~some

in view of the rigors of the

The following statement by an enpineer with

the Institute of Arcttc Environmental
University

or

or Alaska,

Enp:tnf'ler1n~

8ummer1.zes the difficulty

at the

or

antici-

patIng future problems, "engineering experIence shows that
when a new venture of thi. uniqueness initially becomes
operational, unanttcl.pated, significant problema arise and
the previous1,. anticipated problems becOllle dwarfed 1n
signifioance • • • • LI-7ven the psychological factors
1nvo1ved in the operation of extremely large ships under
unbe1t.veb1~

adverl. weather and ice oondItions during

virtual11 continuous night should also prove to be bound1ess1T e~cltlng."16

16Char1es E. Behlke "Arctic En~lneerlng for the
Seventies: a Phl1080PhJ', ARCTIC, Journal or the Arcttc
Institute or Borth America, §eptember 1969. p. 313-314.
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CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC I\fPLICATTONS
Because ot their importance the economic implications
whloh abound In the development of an economIcally feasible
route for surface commeroe will undoubtedly dominate developments tn the legal--politteal and strategio areas of
interest.

While oil Is not the only consideration it is

the eS8ential element in present d.ve1opments and the
realities oreated bY' its dominant position dictate oonslderatton in some detaIl.
Exploration by Federal Agenctes followtng the

~lrchas.

or Ala8ka 1n 1867 revealed natural oil seeps and slp;ns of

lerRe hydrocarbon deposits on the north slope.
~7,OOO

square-mile area

coverin~

In 1923 a

most of the slopets

western half was aet aside as Naval Petroleum Res.rve no. 4.
Exploration by the Nav,r

.rrom

1944 through 1953 disolosed s1x

Bubstantial gas fields, but the few 011 f1elds disoovered
were amall.

However, considerable knowledge on conducting

large-scale engineering enterprises 1n the Arctic was
aoquired.

Pbllowlng 10 lears

or private

.~ploratlon the

largest strike tn Worth Amerioa W88 made near Prudhoe 8&7
in 1968. 1 Estimates range from 10-40 billion barrels in
lLuther J. Carter, "Borth Slope: Oil Ruah", Science,
3 October 1969, p. 86-87.
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this area alone which 1.
ing

~eolo~10

on~

of about twenty equally premis-

structures in Alaaka.

The impact upon the

United States economy may not be fully Bsse.sed for years
to come and the oonsequences or these discoveries are
difficult to roresee. 2
W!thout thts discovery the United States would have
developed a serious shortAge or orude oil.
reserves had fallen to a ten year aupply.

Proven domestic
Most interior

continental fields are past their prime and production 1n
Oallfornia, Louislana and Tex.s .,11 peak In the lat.
aeventies.

Aocordingly, productlon wIll

~ro.

slowly from

9.1 mIllion barrels. day In 1968 to 9.5 ml1110n barrels in
1980.

Average dally consumption in th.e ollme pertod will

olimb trom 12.9 to 18.2 mIllion barrels

8

day, swelling the

U.S. deficit from 3.8 to 8.7 mll110n barrels. day.

The

United States raced the prospect or importing 50 percent ot
i t . needs by 1980.

!he only alternattve would have been to

art11'1clally fix the pr1.ce of 011 at about $4.50 per barrel,
OOl1'lpared wl.th about $3.00 today, 1n order to boost productIon fram high cost wells, 011 shale and coal.
While enormous amounts

or

oapita1 are required to

develop the Alaskan fields, w9l1a are expeoted to produce

2 n • R. Kaplan, "'l'he Ep1 e Voyage of the M'anha ttan",
Review, Sept., Oct. 1969, p. 23.
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!h!.

15--20,000 barrel. per day as campared with the ayerage
U.S. well whioh produces 15.2 barrels a day.

or

Wellhead coata

fl.OO to 1.20 per barrel are being estimated for North

Slope oil which i8 far greater than for Middle East 011.
Added to this the cost or trom 80' to $1.00 per barrel by
pipeline transport, the potential saVing

or

40¢--80¢ per

barrel by surfaoe tanker beoomes indeed significant.
Beoause of the high cost of produotion and transport North
Slope oil Is not lIkely to sell outside the United States.

MIddle East 011 sella In Japan and Canada for about $1.50
per barrel.

Horth Slope oil could not .ell at a competitive

price.
If the Canadian Arctic proves to contsin large quantities of 011 it wtll a180 be

hlF~-prioed

market outside Worth AmerIca.

011, difficult to

However, by the mid-1970's

ten b111ion barrels will repre.ent only 2 ,ears domestic
consumption in the United States.

COft8.~lent17,

the United

States 18 the most lIkely eventual market for Canadian 011
as gell. S
It Is

b~yond

the scope of thIs study to analyze the

complex policy issues

gov~rntng

the production and daBe8tic

distribution of petroleum products.

The petroleum industry

SJeremy Matn, "The Hot 011 Rush In Arcttc Alaska",
Fortune, April 1969, p. 122-124.
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Is not oompetitive in the usual sense.

The damesttc prioe

of crude 011 Is partially insulated tram competltion by
restrlotions enforced by government on both domestic and
foreign supply.

Protection r.rom forelgn sources 1s seoured

by mandatory Import quots. enforced by tne federal govern-

ment.

Theae polioi•• are based on the prem! •• that

unlimi ted imports of loW' cost fore! gn oil wQUld endanfter
nattona1 security by driving the domestl0 price down too
sharply, making the United States too dependent on foreign
011 supplies.

Scrapping of the import quota system in favor

of' a preferential tariff meohanism bas been advocated.
'!'art rts would be set so that very low oos, . i dd1e 'Eastern

oil, somewhat higher prioed Venesue1an 011 and still higher
prioed U.S. domestic ot1 would sell tor sbout the 8ame prIce
at East Coast porta. 4 ~lnal resolution or this proposal may
seriously impact on industry deoisions
port

or

re~ardlng

the trans-

Alaskan oil.

If the Northwest PaBsage proves commerc!all1 feaalble
impact on the United States' Bhlpbu11dlnp. industry eould be
substantIal sinee a federel statute known es the Jones Act
prohibits the transportation

or

vessels between American porta.

~ood8

in foreign built

Under the aurrent planning

4Mcablnet Group Asks Scrapping of 011 Quotas". Washington
Post Ne•• ServIce, The Providence Journal, 18 Dec. 1969, p.16:1.
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raoto~

or one

tanker per 500,000 barrels of demand and a

"turn around" t1me of 30 to 40 days tt has been estimated
that up to thirty 250,000 DIT tankftrs may be requIred by
1980.

A similar potential exIsts In

liqu~fied

natural gas (LNG).

Alaskan natural

~as

th~

transport

or

The potentIal supplies of

may exceed 400 tri1110n cubic feet.

In liquefied form it takes less than l/eOotb of the space
it oocupies in its natural form.

Technology 1s such that

It can be transported tn tankers especially desIgned to
maintain the desired temperature of minus 258 degrees
Pahrenhel t.

Alaskan gas J.8
Japan by this meana. 5

alre~dy

being exported to

The development or surfaoe commeroe on this acale would
make possible the exploitation of tremendous mineral
resources within the Oanadian Arcttc.
entire ps.ttern of world
altered.

t~Bde

Tn th1s event the

could be elFn1 f1 oantly

The Canadian Arcttc Is essentially equidistant

from New York, London and Tokyo. (See Chart 2, Appendix I)
The Northwest Pa8sage takes on added

sl~nlrio.nce

when

one considers the unoertainties in con8tructing the TransAlaska Pipeline System (TAPS).

Although delivery 18 being

5nAla8ka Resources and the Jones Act", Senate COngres810nal Record, Novftmber 12, 1969, p. SI4163.§1416i.
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taken on 48 Inch ateel pipe from Japan and politteal
obstacles to granting a right of .8Y have been e1eared away,
physical obstacles rema1n formIdable.

SOMe conservatIonist

groups are opposed to its oonstruction because of potentIal
pollution problems.

The oonstruction diffioulties, whether

1nsu1ated and buried in the permafrost or elevated to esoape
permafrost problems are tremendous. 6
ComplIcating the feasibility of a marine operation,
however, 1s the monumental task of constructing docking or
loading faoi1ities on Alaska's north ooast.

The extensive

oontinentsl shelf creates limiting depths even more
restriotive than the Perstan 0u1f.

The Manhattan, w1th a

draft of 52 feet, anchored 35 mIles ort Prudhoe Bay.

A

closAr approach .as posstble, but onl7 about six miles
closer.

The 250,000 DWT tankers being oontemp1ated .111

draw about 65 feet.

Rven wi. th adequate soundings fa c111 t1 8S

.111 have to be const:ruoted at 1Hat 20 mlles 01"1' the coast.

Furthermore, th1.s 18 In an area where "the heavy polar Ice
pack 18 never far off the coast and can advance onto the
shore at any time".

7

The rinal form for a suitable year

round fae111 ty has not yet been de.flned.

Conoentrated

8Carter, Sci.nol, p. 90.
7U•S• Navy Hydrographic offIce, Oceanographic At1•• of
£he Polar Seas, Part II Arctic, Washington, D.C., p. 4'.
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studtes and model testing are underway.

While con8truction

Is cons1.dered feasible. esttmates range from $150-500 million

which 1s more than the average United Stetes port has
1.nvested in all its facilitles. 8 Storage problema and the
high construction costs

or

the tankers required would pre-

clude the consideration of a summer 8eason only operatton.
In summary it seems 10g1.oal to assert that estimates
ot both the potential value of Arctic resources and the coat
of their exploitation will oontinue to escalate .s addition-

al knowledge la acquired.

The most recently reported

estimate or cost of th$ two alternatives of t2-3 billion for
an ice-breaker tanker .Y8tem and $3-8 billion for a TransCanadlan-United State. pIpelIne system sUFgesta the wid.
renge

or

Imponderables faced by industry decision makers.

Transportation will remain the key problem.
pro~reaa

9

Technological

and market demands wi.ll determine the rate of

explo1 tatton.

It appears obvlous that economio facts of

life will determine fUture developments.
Excellent examples of auch cost esoalation are provided
by both the trans-A1aeka pIpe11ne aystem (TAPS) and the cost

8nAlaaka Lacke Harbor for Manhattan", N.Y. lflmes Hewa
Service. Providenoe Snndal Journal, October 26, 1969, p. B48.
9William D. Smith, "Oetting Out Alaskan Oil", N.Y. Tl... ~
ServIce, The ProvIdence ~ournal, 2 January 1969, p. 7:1.

-
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or

oonatruetlon of large ioe-breaker tankers.

estImates of $900 million tor

~APS

have been esoalated to

$1.6 billion and evidence suggest. it may reaoh
before oompletion.

Original estImates

tanker are likewise escalating
acquired.

2'7

8S

Orip:lnal cost

or

t2

billion

$50 million per

additional knowledge is

CHAPTER V

LFGAL--POLTTICAL

CONSTDF.RA~IONS

nToo orten students of for~tgn arfatrs have behaved

8S

though they were the t'rustrated diplomats some aspired to be.
turning the F,lare or scholarship upon our relations with
carta!n nattons only atter those relattona have become
strained".

1

The nsture of Canadtan/U.S. relat10Dshlps was ohanping
well before the disoovery of 011 In Alaska.

This change

results from a growing debate over the development of a
national senae of purpose and

8

desIre to remove Canada fram

such olose identifIcation with the United States.
tbat Canada 18 the only major

o~Jntry

The faot

In the world wIth a

sIngle neighbor. that she 18 the second largest oountry 1n
the world yet has a total population not muoh

lar~er

than

metropolitan new York CIty have all oomb1ned to sIgnificantly
effect her nattonal attltudes. 2
While the auccessful transIt of the V.nhattan oould not
have been aooomplished without extensive Canadian oooper,~

atton and assietanoe, disturbing and emotional questions
1

RobIn W. Winks, "Controllln~ Factors In CanadianAmerioan Relatione", The Australian Journal o~ Pol1tloB and
Ristor!, August 1968, p. 193.

aIbid., p. 200.

-
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have been raised.

The event baa helF,htened nationalist10

!9naltivities resultIng in increased domestic pressure to
8ssert exap:gersted olaims of' sovereignty. 3

Arguments for

the so-oalled sector principle have been revived.

Assertion

of Boveretgnty over all the waters between the Canadian
Arcttc Islands by delimitation with straight base lines has
been advocated.

Still others have insisted on abandonment

of the prfu,entlr asserted three mile territorial sea in
favor of a 12 mile territorial limit.
importanoe

of

Reoognizing the

transportation to the development of their

own extensIve natural resource potential others perceive
suoh measures

88

ultimately self-defeating.

Keenly aware

of the delicate eoology or the Arctio the primary oonoern
of responsible officials appears to be tbe1r ab1ltty to
oontrol the threat of pollution.
Unquestionably balio issues have been raised which were
largel,. aoademl0 prior to the Manhattan test.
~vid.nce

T.n~ible

of profitable exploitation has raised the apectre

of confliot over territorial rights.

However, a aystem for

reFulation and oontrol muat be established without Making
the region the aoene or international disoord. 4
3

Ji~ Hampton, ftA Dispute Bre.s: The Passage Port or
Canada? • Tb! Nat10nal Observer, Sept. 22, 1969, p. lIe.
4 P1nn So111e, "Arotto and Antarctic - Current Problema
in the Polar Regions". C00!iratton and Oonflict. Hordic
Studies in Internat! anal Pollics, '.nua17 1969. p. 124-127.
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One of the basio issues coneerning sovereIgnty in Arctio
waters has been the unique aspect presented by an 10e
eovered sea.

Elaborate arguments have been developed to

justify aooording sea ioe the same status

8S

land.

Since

we have already 8een that the Ice breaks up and becomes
mobile within the

pa8sa~e

dur1ng the summer season the

following observation would clearly apply:

The fact that the Arctic Ocean Is partly covered
with ioe, has not been aeoepted In International
Law as a reason to dt verge from the normal status
or htp.h sea., matnly beoause the ice is constantly
on the move. Here the space 'actor play. a role.
It could not oome under the sovereignty or 8 state
because It ohange. constantly, larll;8 canals and 5
open places being formed and disappearing a~aln.
The sector principle, f1 ret proolaimed by Mr. Porter 1n

1907, In the Canadian Senate and adopted by the SovIet Union
by its unilateral declaration in 1926, was intended to
establish sovereignty over islends in that .eotor whether
discovered or not.

Under thIs scheme the meridians on the

east and west border of the coast l1ne of the continent, or
lslands, are extended to the pole to enolos.
jurisdictIon.

8

trlsnFle of

Asid. from the raot that no nation has

sctually asserted sovereignty over waters within such.
sector, most authorlties have concluded that tht. 18 not a
5

M. W. Mouton, !he InternatIonal Reitme of the Polar
Seas, Academy of' International taw, 1 . . 9{jthotf. Leyden,

l'mm',

p. 201.
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reoognized doctrine

or 1nternati.onal

law and 1a not a

recognized method of acquisItion of territorial sovereignty.
FUrthermore, the theory has no practical importance for
Arctic regions 1n

80

far

8S

the status quo ia generally

acquleeoed In by other states and Increased aerial exploration haa not led to the discovery of additional Islands. 6
While it bas been argued that the Anglo-Norwegian
F18herie~

decislon haa ju.tlrl~d drawIng straight baseline.

around the entire Canadian Arcttc Archipelago in order to
declare them internal waters, at least one Canadian soholar
has submitted:

That any delimItation that olosed off the Northw.st
Passage would be contrary to tnternattonal law. It
.ould mean dI"8wlng a lIne of at least 50 mIle.
acrOBa the entrance of Lancaster Sound in the east
and another olosing line or nearly 100 miles acro••
McClure StraIt in the we.t. This .erle8 of strait.
connects the AtlantiC and the Paolr1c Ocean. In a
dIrect and olear channel of' at least 25 181.18. wloe
exoept in one plaoe Where, a. we have •••n, the
presence of a rew lalands reduoes 1t to not le88
than 15 mtles. 7
Se goes on to point out that the PrInce or Wale8 Strait 1s
the only plaoe Where Canada could logically interfere wltb
the passaFe or foreign shlps.
6
7

-

Ibid., p. 243-244.

A. Donat Pharand, "Innooent Pa8sa~e in the Arctic",
The Canadian Yearbook ot InternatIonal t.w, 1968, p. 58.
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In still another thoughtful appraIsal of Canada'. oa8e
for territoriality of Archipelago waters a legal histortan
with the CanadIan Department of IndIan Affairs and Northern
Development

hAS

conoluded that:

In resolving the.8 problema it 1s far more desirable to maintain a decent respect for Internat1 ona1
law than to attempt to bend or stretch it to serve
national ends. Two basic principles, freedom of
the h1gh s ••s and freedom or. air space above international waters, have been under severe attack 1n
recent years. Canada, 1n common with other nations,
hal far more to galn tn the long run by upholding
these prInciples than be subverting theM. This 1.
partioularly true 1n the Arctic, where what there
is to be galned 1s small compared with what there
1a to be lost In other parts of the wor1d. 8

The influence or thIs reasoninF,

app~rs

evIdent In the

statement of Pri_ M1n1.ster Trudeau tn the Houee of Commons
on 24 October 1969, when he stated that "to deny pas.BF.e to
all foreIgn vessels tn the

nam~

of' CanadIan sovet"elgnty

would be a8 Bense1esa as placIng barriers across the
entrances to Halifax and Vancouver harbora."
tIme hts statement contains ample evidence
anxiety over

po~entlal pollu~ion

problems.

At the 9Ame

or

natlona1

OrferlnF 8ssur-

anoes that Canad!an pol1c.r wIll be "designed ror environmental proteotton" and "will not be an intolerable

interferenoe with the acttvities of others" nor" b@ •

8Gordon W. Smith, "SovereIgnty In the North: The
CanadIan Aspect or an Internat!onal PrOblem", The Arctic
FrontIer, R. St. J. Macdonald, ed. Toronto, 19~a~6~,~--~7
p. 255.

restriction to progress" he alluded to "legielation"
whloh would oontribute "to the long-term and sustained

development

or

resouroes for eoonomio and 800ial programs."

He further suggested "a combinati. on of an international
regime end the exeroise by the Canadian government of ita
own authority in the Canadian Arctic", "to ensure that
irreparable harm w111 not oocur

8S

a result of neglipent

or intentional oonduct".
The vagueness of this statement precludes speoulation
on the outline of f.orthooming proposale.

However, some

evidence of current thinking in thle regard Is provIded by
the follOWing:
While the newspapers have been urging proclamations
of 8overel~t1 over the Arctic waters In various
wa,.s, the announcements of government polley to
date indicate that the Oanadian 80vernment wlll
introduce measures to oontrol pollution and related
probl..s and limit ita immediate aotion to that. In
my own opinion, .s expressed in varIous placea, It
18 not necessary to have sovereignty over particular
waters to assert a power to control, to punish, or
to prevent pollution of thoae waters, the littoral
state having suCh pollution control powera
a
matter of ouatomal'1' InteJ-n8tlonal la" even wl thout
any formal treaty authority to do 80. 9

.a

This statement would tend to 8UPPort a conclusion that,
while the lssue is 8 lively one for home oonsUMption, Canada
18 unlikely to impose reatrlct!ons beyond those desIgned to
9

2d1rerd McWhinneY'. Professor or Law and Director In8t1Air and Spaoe Law, MoGi11 UniversIty, Montreal
era on.! Correspondence dated 29 October 1989.
'

;ute

or

control pollution wIthin the 12-ml1e limit, or oontiguous
zone.
Even

conc~dtng

thAt International 8entlment makes

universal adoption of a l2-mlle tArt-itor!8l sea eppMr
Imminent, auen universal acoeptance would not 8iFntficantly
alter the situation.

or

course, all of Prince of Wa1ee

Strait and one other small sectlon of the passage, that seotton of Barrow Strait contsln1ng Young And Lawthet- Islands,
88 desoribed on

pa~e

14, would beoome entirely territorial

Bea, however, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the terrItorial
Bea olearly provide8 for tnnocent pasaage throUFh suCh
waters.

The aforementioned discuss10n by a Canadian scholar on
the legal status of the Northwest Pa.saFe has been summar-

ized as follows:

ravour or

!!!

"There Is a right of Innooent passage in

ship. throughout the lforthwel!!lt P.ssage, by

virtue of general international law as 1t existed before,
and a. 1t has developed linee, the TerritorIal 8ea Convention
of 1988. n 10
A recent notit1catlon by 011 Indu8tPJ official. that
fUrther tanker test. are contemplated in the 8pring have
in! t1ated a resurge of natIonal sentlmt'nt to take prompt
10

Pharand, p. 60.

aetion to assert Canadian sovereignty.

The External Affairs

Minister came close to such an assertion before the House
of Commone on 19 February.ll

On subsequent questtontng the

Prime Minister altered the language sufficiently to demonstrate that his pr1.mary concern 18 wi th measures to reduoe
the risk or pollution.

These exchanges simply serve to

emphasize the degree of pressure, both from the public and

some members of government, being placed on Canadian
offioiais.

Rising rears of' impending pollution problema

.ere reinforced when the Liberian tanker Arrow, oarrying
3.8 million gallons or. 011 grounded and broke up tn Nova

Scotia's Chedabucto Bay on 4 February.

The•• events .upgeat

an urgent need for early btlateral negotiations to resolve
mutual problema before unneoessary frIotion develops.
The problema of pollution control peouliar to the

Arctio environment are quIte properly of equal concern to
the United States.

Our burgeoning domeatic preoccupation

wIth artifioial deteploratton

conoern.

or

the envIronment diotate.

"011 spills on the waters

or

Cook Inlet are

common, as the petroleum industry enters the production
atage.

How Cook Inlet w111 react to extenalve 011 pollution

Is unknown because our documented knowledge 1s inadequate

___

~1_

11

John &rna, "'Bar 'lanker if not aare, PM Indicates",
Toronto Globe and MatI, 21 ~bruarJ-1970, p. 1:3.

to predict the behavior
estuary... 12

or

a cold-water, silt-laden

The threat or 011 8p!.ll8 are by no means the

only problem.

Plain garbage and human excrement

tial problems.

81'8

poten-

GarbaF.e simply doesn't disappear unlAs8

consumed by indigenous mammals.

ShIp

traffic on a commer-

cial basis could generate significant problema unless
adequately controlled.

Holding tanks and incinerators may

prove to be essential.

"POI' example, in the Point Barrow

area, the navy and various other group. under contract for
011 exploration have accumulated a. estimated one-quarter

or a millIon drum. or human wastea because no reasible disposal method is available •• • • ~-7eoes8.r7 research
must be instituted to acquIre an understanding or ecosystem dJDamlcs in the Morthland."13

In spite

or

an apparent unreasoned anxiety over Amerioan

domination 1n the Aretlc, manifested by strong domestIc
pressures to take aotion whIch would limit auch ambItIons,
it seems evident that responsible Canadian leadership is
trying to en8ure that logic wll1 prevail over
FUrthermore, it i8

d1 rtloult

~motion8.

to conceive what u8eful purpose

12

Lotspeich, Frederick B., "Water Pollution in Al••ka:
Present and Future", SCIRllCE, Deoember, 1969, Reprinted in
Senate Congressional Record, December 9. 1969, p. 816146.
13

-

Ibid.
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would be served even 1 r an unoontested ola1m to sovereignty
over these waters could be established.

Canada's ola1m to

the land seems olearly establtshed and the resources of the
extensive continental shelf which underlie these waters
could hardly be oontested.
It 1s suggested that any unilateral aotton, prior to
concrete evidence that a marine operation through the Northwest Passage can be

~ade

economically feasible, could be

both selt-defeating and politically embarrassing.

Even the

assertion of the limited jurisdiction necessary to control,
to punish or to prevent pollutIon would seem to imply the
responsloi 11 ty to prov! de the servi oea whioh
required.

~e

wi 11

be

cost of navigational aids and additional

loe-breaker support alone hes been estimat.d at tl billion
by the Canadian Minister of Trenaportatlon. l 4

Mutual con-

cern over pollution control, severe environmental challenges
and the obvious advantages to be gained by opttmlz1ng
limited tinaneial, scIentific, support and trained manpower
resources would seem to prov1 de a firm b••1s tOl' m.eanlngf'Ul
bilateral or multilateral arrangements to the mutual advantage of all nations with an interest 1n the Arettc.

14"0..
uwes!.

r nvttes Bickel to View O!l DrIlling", The

Providence Sunday Journal, 21 Sept. 1969, p. 5-12:1.---
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As alluded to in the discussion of economl0 consider.
atlons, in the final analy81s the solution to most
problems wl11 b8 dictated by economlcs.

or these

A former VIce-

President and Managing Direotor or the Vining AssocIation
of Canada has suggested that if exploitation 18 to oocur,
"Capital is all important.

It wtl1 be needed In quantities

beyond the capacity of Canadiana to 8upply.
rore,

of'

It iI, there-

major importance that Canada should continue to

maintain the favorable investment cllmate that has
characterized her economy trom the earliest da18.

Both

public and private oapital will be required, partlcularly
In the field of establishing transportation facilitIes.

Thi. haa been the pattern 1n the paat and 1s certainly the
key to tne ruture.~l5
An apparent fear of United States economic domination
has been generated by the flot that of lS,OOO Canadlan

oClDpanles wl th forelgn capt tal investment 7,000 are controlled by Amerioana.

What se8m. to be overlooked In thl.

argument 1. the fact the t whIle totalrorelgn Invf'stment In
Canada today exceeds $86 btlllon, tnoludhtg American t\lndl,
Canadian investment In the Untt8d States i . f,13 billion.

15

V.c. Wan8b~ough, "The Canadian ArctIo: A Freezer PUll
of Mlnepals", INTr:RPLAY, Apr!l 1969, p. 34.
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When the population ratio of" 10 to one 18 considered this
is a rather remarkable investment. 1S
Tn summary it seems

ObV'OU8

that by m'.nlm'zlng the

potential for disoord the North American Arctic offers a
unique opportunity tor a mutually beneficial bilateral
approaen to problem resolution, environmental research,
exploration. Jmproved transportation technology and support
systems development.

SUM an approach could provide the

basia for eventual multilateral/regional arrangements with
political and economio implioations for the entire international community.

16

Michael Cope. "Worried Neighbor, Canada in U.S. ShadOW",
The Providenoe Journal, 14 ~bruary 1970. p. 18:1.
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CHAPTER Vl

INFLUENCE ON ARCTIC SECURITY
"It is dirfioult to impress upon the publio and
industry at lar~e that the most essential quality of the
Arctio is not cold, or gold, or po18~ bears, but a central
position 1n the world oommunity."l

As previously noted, a

point near the western entrance to the Northwest

Pas8a~e

is

Feographically in the oenter of the great ooncentration or
population and industry of tn. world.

This central position

haa long been the key to it, strategi0 significance.
from this

geo~raphl0

tact the ares has had littl. intrinsI0

strategic importance In itself.
prIvate domain

Apart

It has largely been the

or the alrorart and the 8ubmsr!ne as milItary

planners have focused on 1t8 significanoe aa a route for
weapons delivery Iystems.

Its importance has been dependent

on developments outaide tbe region itSAlf.

The only major

military aotivities oondueted in the area relate to surveillance and local defense.

The barriers of climate, distanoe

and construction cost. have operated effeotively 1n the paat
to aeverely lim1t ita own strategic slgnifioanoe.

Ita

prinoipal importancehaa historically been aa a barrier
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thereby providing defense tn depth.

However, wtth the

advent of the ICBM era, techno1oFY has triumphed over

geography to the extent that the inhospitable climate and
terratn of the area no longer provide

seoure stJ"Btee:lc

8

berrier. 2
The promise of the openlng

or

the Arcttc to commercial

development on a major scale has slgnttloantly altered the
situation of the psstdecade.

The natural wealth of the

ares dictates that exploitation w111 eventually ooeur.

As

thie oocurs the strate!Tl0 importance of' the ares will
1.neresslngly be determined by the nati ons most dependent
on these resources.

The

importsn~e

of Alaskan otl to the

United States' eoonomy has already been disoussed. Potent1s1
independence from

foret~

sources of supply 18

substantIal strategio slgntf1csnoe.

8

faetor of'

While we have seen that

011 produoed in this area Is not lIkely to become competittve

with that produced in the Middle East thIs newly discovered
competition to Middle Eest primacy could eventually alter
internatIonal attitudes and patterns

or

beoome an important alternative source
to Europe and Japan in the event

or

behavior.

o~

It could

Industria1 power

international tension

or orisis.
2

R. J. Sutherland, The Arctto Frontier, p. 277-278.
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If surface commerce develops, exploitatIon

or

resources by bulk carrier will naturally follow.
dependenoe on mineral

reBaurc~s

mineral
As

from the area by other

industrialized nations increases. their coneern rer protection of thIs maritime commerce w1ll increase proportionately.

A need will be generated for harbor facilities,

storage areas. navigatIon systems, support vehioles and
faciII tiss whi ch will require some degree

0

r seourity.:5

The eoonomic and strateg10 s'Fnlfloanoe of the Northern
Sea Route anrl its cont1nued development, over nearly 50
years, by the Sov1ets, 1.s well known.
reason to believe that expanded

UfJe

There 1s every
" this
route wtl1 con-

of

tinue bacause of the freedom of movement it provIdes.

By

gBop'.raphtc necessIty the Soviet Navy has gained valuable
experience in Arcttc operations beyond that of any other
natton.

The restrlotions imposed by the environment make

surface vessels ut11lztnp, Aretta Sea Routes extremely
vulnerable.

As internattonal

oomm~ro~

builds up in the

restricted BerIng Streit lts strategic importanee wtll cont1nue to

@1:'0w.

The requirement to develop an Arot1o

Maritime defensive capabi11ty on the part or both the
3

Anthony Harrip:an. "Northern nefens8 Frontier", M11itan
Review. December 1969, p. 4-5.

4J • J."Laforest, "Strategio SlRn1ftcsnce o~ the NorthArn
Sea Route • U.S. Naval Institute ProoeedinS8, D~c. 1967,
p. 56-65.
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United States and Canada w1l1 be dependent on the rate of
economic exploitation and development.

Consioeration of commercial sub-surfaoe systeMs is
beyond the scope

o~

this discusslon.

Haw~vp.r.

feast b1lt ty of such development haR c1..,arly
The adventaFee to be
wl11 remain

8

~a1ned

established.

function or the nbt1Ity of teohnology to
That this w131 occur 1n

the caming decades seems assured.
8

b~en

indioate that their development

establish eoonomic feasibility.

develops

the

As submarine commerce

requirement for oontro1 and defen.lve .ystems

wtll likewise develop.
"There

18 8

quickening of interest 1n the far north.

This interest necessarIly extends to stretepic factors
tnvolvin~

the Northern reg10na and to questions conoerning

defense of land. air and BeQ

alon~

8 frozen frontier.

Military profeiBiona1s, a9 much as specta1ists 1n transportatIon and 1ndustry, wIll be faoed .111 new ohallenges
result."5

as a

5

HBrrlp;an. "Northern Defense FrontIer", p. 8.
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CHAP~R

VTI

THTERNATTONAL IMPLICATIONS
Current developments in the Arctic provide a striking
parallel to current developments in the seabed.

Our trag.

mentary knowledge provides a peculiar mixture of realism
and fantasy 1n any

e~rort

to evaluate ruture developments.

The promise of great wealth produces potent191 oonf1ict yet
the harshness

or

the environment tosters a realizatIon of

the necessity for cooperation.

Arctio have been desoribed

A8

Both

th~

seabed and the

the "last t.rontter"

or mankind,

Selective exPloltation,l 1.-.., taking the espec1s1ly
valuable in order to mf'et raw materfal requirements that
cannot be more reedily met from other sources, most accurately desoribes the future potentIal of both.

This is what

has been happeninp; throuphout the Arcttc, even w1thtn the
USSR, Bnd thftre seems eVAry likelihood that th18 w111

conttnue.

The knowledge that

coupled with an

err~cttv.

ext~nltve

economic

otl deposits exist,

d~8nd,

have provided the

stimuluB for developing a means ot transporting this resouroe.
The process of proven resource knowledpe and a demonstrated

economic demand followed by export from the Arctic to markets
elsewhere tn the world wl11 have IncreaslnF1y important
10eorge W. Rogers, nThe Int~rnat1onal ImpllcBtions of
ArctIc Exploitation", The Arctic Frontier, p. 295.
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international implications as demand inors88es Bnd supplIes
elsswhere diminish.
World-wide demand
to grow

8S

natural resources will oontinue

1'01'

n result of populatlon growth. oonttnufng tnter-

national competition and

1nor~8stng

contribution of' the Arot! 0 wlll
produce these resources at

B

per-capita demand.

d~pl"!nd

price

The

on the abt 11 ty to

p~rm1tt1ng

them to be

compet1 ti ve 1n world markets and the extent to whl.oh the
more acoessible souroes become depleted.

The p1'6!1ent rocus

on oil exploitation verifies this obsl"!l'vation.
Japan. supported primarily by a Manuf'scturlnp economy.
must oompete with other industrial nstions for sources of
row materials.

The .ruture development of Alaska's resource

potential 18 dtrectly related to Japan's raw material
requirements.

C8n8d~'s

over-all trade w1th Japan has

quadrupled In the past decade and the trend
upward. 2

~emaln8

sharply

A dramatic example of other untapped resources 18 the
fabled Mary River tron ore

~eposlt8

Exploratory drtll1ng has established
hl~h

on Baffin Island.
8n

ore body thel'e

enough quality to reed directly tnto the fUrnaces or

the world'. steel centers.

Deposits of tungsten, leod.

zinc. nlokel and oopper are known to exist.

-

or

2

An extended

"Opening a New Frontier K • U.S. News and World Report,
18 August 1969. p. 37.
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shipping season would have a profound effect on the mining
industries of the

A~ct10

which Are st11l in the infancy

stage.
Possibilities exist wh1.ch are not now predictable.
ability

or

the 'Manhattan to

ne~ot18te

The

polar pack 1ce west

of Banks Island, in the Beaufort Sea. leads to speculation
on the eventual development
across the Aretic

Oc~an,

or

a oommercial route d1rectly

bearing in mind that. in spite

or

her size, the Manhattan was really only a model in terms of
commercial vessels under construction.

This has Important

1.mpllcatlons for Japan with expertise in mammoth ship

construotion.
As traditional transport teohnolop.y improves,
European markets may actively seek new sources

or

Weste~n

natural

resources to replace disappearing domestic sources.

Aretic

resources should aSBume increaslny, importance In the continued

~ro.th

Thi.

or the developed nations of the world.

will assume indirect world-wide importanoe in

rel~88inF

pressure on resources elseWhere which wtl1 become acoessib1e
to underdeveloped nations or the world. 3
One factor wh1ch must be constdered In a realistic
appraIsal

o~

Aretic potential 18 the 1nares.inFo evidenoe

that the USSR 18 makIng far 1es8 {mpressive
:5

pro~e88

Ropers, The Arettc Frontier, p. 310-311.
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In

Arctic development than has generally been belIeved.

Her

demonstrated interest 1n MIdr1le East 011 can undoubtedly
be traoed to an !.noresstng realization of' the phyl!llcal and

economic diffioulties

or

exploiting Arctio resources.

Internationally the United States shares its Arctio
interest with Canada, Norway, Denmark and the USSR. Although
they do not abut the Arctic Ooean, F1nland, Sweden and
Ioeland also have a keen interest in Arettc matters.

The

growing feas1btlity of resource exploitatIon w111 inevitably
expand the Interfece between nat10ns with an Arctto interest
and impact on their national and internat10nal polioies.
International cooperation in science and technology appears
essential In order to make optimum use of money and searoe,
traIned manpower.
The experience F$lned in Antarctic cooperat1on during
the past decade and the var1,ouB international cooperative
investigations oonducted dur1np, the Interne.t1on.l
GeophysloAl year provIde useful precedents tor expended

Arctio actiVity.

Agencies lIke the Arctic tnstitute of

North Amer1ca, The Soott Polar Research Institute and The
International Council of Scientifio unions (tCSU) represent
expertise capable of fostering and sustaining
coordination in international Arctic research.
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010S8

CHA PTER VII I

IMPACT ON

U.~.

POLICY

Rapidly developing evidence of the growing econom10
and strategtc importance of the ArctIc found the Un1ted

States without an articulated Arcti0 polioy.

This waB

apparently the result of preoccupat1. on wi. th Antarctioa

during the past decade and a peneral lack
ot Arctic potential.

The report

supports this observation.

or

or

appreciation

the Stratton Comm18Bion

"At present, only the Antarctic

progrom is formally ooordinated w1. thln the Federal structure,
but steps are underway to estab11sh a somewhat oomparable
national effort in

~~e

Arctic rep10n • • • • The Commission

does not believe that the consolidatIon of Polar researoh
activities 1s An immediate need of the saMe

ur~ency

8S the

other elements of its reoommended or~anlzBtton plan."l
Substqntlal effort Is now underway to formulate a
Nattonal

Po11o~

for Arct1c programs.

On 19 Ootober 1969

the Vice-President, as ChaIrman of the Nat'onel Council on
Marlne Resources Bnd Eng'neerlng Development, snnounced a

new fi ve-po1,nt prograM to strengthen the natlods marine
I

Our Natton and the Sea, Report of the Comm1ssion on
Marine gol.noe, Inglneerlng and Resources, U.S. Oovtt
Printing Office, January 1969, p. 243-244.
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science aotivltles.

Included as its fifth prop,ram is:

Arctic Environmental R~8earch: Ocean related
research wtll be acoelerated on the interaction of man with the Arctic environment.
Arcttc r~8eBrCb activities w111 be intensified, both to permit fuller utilization of
this rapidly developing area and to insure
that such activities do not inadvertently
deprBde the Arcttc environment. Initial
emPna818 wfll be on strength~ninF and broadening Arctic research capabilities. Conatderatton
will 8lso be directed to formulattng an ov..,rall policy framework for Arcttc related
activltt~8 • • • • Seleotion of the ftve priority
pro~ram. followed an intensive Gov~rnment-wld.
review of urpent needs of the na tion 'n relat10n
to Marine Afrat rs. Tbf'tse part! cnlar needs oannot
await the result of longer range studtes. 2
On 18 November 1969, the Seoretary of the Interior pro-

posed that the Interior Department be designated lead
ap:ency to chatI' an !.nter-arency task force to formulate a

cohfltrent plan, the first draft or whIch would be ready
approximately nine months after beginning work.

Once the

plan 1s completed cooperatton and assIstance would be
8ou¢lt from other nat10ns such

illS

Cs.nada, Denmark and the

Soviet Union.!
The stated just1, f1cat1 on for thIs proposal was based

on the present lack

o~

"clear-cut leadersh'tp in Arcttc

Matters" and the fact that stewardship

or

ftmoet

or

the

lands", "mueh of the waters" and the "mineral r~80t1reea"
2

Senate Congressional Record, 21 Ootober 1969, P. 812862.
Letter from Seo'y of the Int~rlor to the PresIdent or
the United States dated 18 November 1969.
:5
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of both the land and the vest cont!nental shelf 18 the
direct responsibility or the Department of Interior,
On 2 December 1969, the Seoretary of the Navy forwarded

a counter-proposal that

8S

an interim measure the role of

the existing Tnter-ap-ency Arctic Researoh Coordinating
Committee be expanded to incorporate all phases of Arctic
development planning.·

This recommendation was baaed on

the belIef that the creation of

8

force at this time 18 premature.

new

1nter-8~eno1

task

That it would be imprudent

to undertake a oomprehensive U.S. plan for the Arcttc before
a number of important international legsl and polItical
problema are solved.

These include international aFreement

on the breadth of the territorial sea and the seaward limit
or the oontinental ahelf.

Reoogn1z1ng the present tnsta-

bili ty of the poll tt cs 1 81tuat1 on the Seoretory or the
Navy 1a conoerned that
oreation of

8.

th~

publicity resulting from the

new U.S. governmental group could result in

increased domestic pressure on the Canadian government to
assert jurisdictional cla1ma which

m1~ht

prejudlcfl future

development.
The languaf!;8 of" the Interior proposal s e ...ms to indicate

a preoccupation w1.th developmental planning 1n Arctic
4

of

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the President
the United StateR, dated 2 December 1969.
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Alaska while the Navy proposal is properly concerned with
the broader aspects of Arctic development and the importance of the Arctic a8 a defense frontier.

The Tnter-aFency

Arctic Research Coordinating CommIttee whlch oonstitutes an
eX1st1ng vehtcle for Arcttc development planning 18 chaIred
by the National Sci enee Foundation and includes 1n its

membership representatives rrom the

Ofrtc~

of "eval ReSe8l'"oh,

Army, Air Foroe, Coast Guard, Atom1c Energy Commission, and
the Departments of Intertor, State, Apr1oulture, Commerce
and Health Education and Welfare.

The Nattonal Science

Foundation already has responsibility for and extensive
exper!tmce 1n the formulation of po1tcy and proFrBms in

Antarctica.
The

chal1en~e8

which face Federal apenc!es, the State

of Alaska, industry and the soientific and engineering
oommunities are penerating studies and related activIties
acr08S a broad front.

In a press

rel~ase

or

2! Aupust 1968,

the Secretary of Transportation stated In part "The Department of Transportation w111 investigate the feasibility of
extendln~

the shipping seB80n eo

8S

to permtt

of ocean transportation to and from Arcttc
ort1c~

deve1opm~nt

A1Aska.~

The

of Naval Rese.rch, under projeot TIAPA, i8 oonduct-

ing s comprehensive examinetion of
roles and mIssions in

th~

Arettc research and a long

Arctic.
ran~e
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th~

Navy's potentIal

An evaluation of NoV1
plan for future research

has been prepared by

Q

8cientlstrrom the Naval Undersea

Warfare CAnter, San Diego.

The Nat10nal Science Foundation

Is planning the inittation of an Arcttc Research Progrem.
The Committee on Polar Research of

~he

Soiences, has In prop-ress an appraisal
for each

or

National Academy

or

lonp'

r8n~e

or

plans

the ~• .1or so1fmttf10 d18ctp11nes. 5

The National Council on Mertne Resources and Enp1neertng development tn its third report to the Congress dated
J8nua~

17, 1969, deve1Qped the outline for a National

Arctic polloy and suggested proF,rsms to promote suoh a
polioy.

'!'hie statemfl'!nt ref1eots a keen appreciation of

Aretic prob1eme and subetant1ates the attractivene8s

or

international cooperation 1n Arctic developmental p1annIng. 6
Economio constraints, severe envIronmental barriers
and a paucity of trained manpower oomblne to sugpest the
necessity for planning innovations tn both the public and
private sector, if sign1f1 cant progress 19 to be aohieved.
High level ooor11natlon appears essential to th~ tntelll~ent

direotion of effort.

Inter-a~ency

rivalries or ambItions

5Robert A. Frosch, C1081ng addresB, ProcfIledlnp's of the
U.S. Naval Arcttc Research Laboratory, Dedication Symposium,
Fairbanks, Alaska, 9-12 April, 1969. ARCTIC, Journal of the
Arctic Institute of North America, Sept. 1069, p. 382.

SMartn. Soleno Affairs - A Year of Broadened PartiolRation, The fhird leport of the PresIdent to the Congress on
l'Iirlne Resources and Enp!.neering Development, U. S. Gov't
Printing Offioe, Washington, D.C., January 1969, p. 144.
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must be prevented from developtnF into thtnly d18FUleed
attempts to aohieve single agent proponency in Arctic
matters.

Inter-industry competition should not result In

the expenditure of substantial amounts of. private cepital
wlthout an appropriate return in teohnological knowled".e
end expertise.

Nat1.onal rivalries should not be permitted

to generate shortsighted internetional policy assertions
to the eventual detriment or

enll~~tened.

long term progress.

The manifold problems in Arctic exploitation appear to
provide an unpreoedented opportunity for meBnlngrul
bilateral cooperation between tne United States and Canada.
Deliberate and fully coordinated

p18nnln~

by

responsIble

representatives of both government and industry s@eme
essent18l to prevent unwarranted r.rletton or conflict and
to provide the bost. ror attracting sufficient prIvate
capital to susta1n

developm~nt.

Canada has a large area or Arctic territory and a
compe.rittvely amall population to explore and exploit it.
It appears very much in her Interest to enoourage bilateral
oooperation in the north.

The Advisory Oomml ttee on

Northern Development 18 responsible

~or

advising the

Canadian government on questIons of pol1 cy relati ng to
northern Canada and providing for the effectIve coordination
of all

~overnment

aotivities there.

This body and the U.S.

Inter-ageney Arctic Research Coordinating Committee could
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CHAPTFR IX

CONCLUSTONS AND RECOMMENrATTONS
Conolusions developfl'ld in this study may be 8ummarh:ed
follows:

88

Although past prophecies of Arotic development have
ht8to~loally

tended to underestimate the physical

imposed by the environment and current

efro~ts

bar~ler8

suggest

8

continuation of this tendency. the development of a oommerolally feasible North.est Passage Is olearly in the
notional tnterest of both the United States and Canada.
Such a route would provide the oapability to exploit mineral
resources

or

the Arctic in

8Uppo~t

of the nettonal economy.

provide an alternative trade route to the strategically
vulnerable Panama Canal and provide the potential tor tne
eventual development of signifioantly shortened International trade routes.
The Manhattan transit waa a suoce•• In terms of test
objectives and an important tentattve step in the development of a transportation system.

FUrther

test1n~

ts

required durIng the wInter season to establIsh eoonomic
feasibility before a deois1on can be made
struction or the expensive
be

r~qu1red.

In~

or

loe-br~aker

re~ard1ng

oon-

tankers which would

the alternatives oons1dered In transport-

Alaakan 011 the

~oonomtes o~rered by
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Martne Burface

transportation make this option the most attractive in
terms of oapital commitment.

The odds that

1~.r

round

feasibility cen be conclusively demon.treated appear
tenuous at this time.

Regardless of the outoome, these

tests w111 have important application 1n the eventual
exploitation of Arcttc resources with le8s critioal 8torage problema or wblch could be transported during a shorter
navigation 88880n.
~

Transportation 9t.ll remaIn the principal problem 1n
~

the exploitation of Arctic resouroes In the
ruture.

t'or~8eeab18

lb:plo1 tation will 1nevi tably occur but the tre-

mendous capital required will fUnction to retard the rate
'.'l-

of development which will remain dependent on; market
demand, the ability of teohnology to produce and transport
these resourcea at prioes competitive In world markets,
and the extent to whIch aore acces8ible sources become deplated.

Without the dual incentives

demand for petroleum products and the

or

United States

~8ubBld18."

provided

by current petroleum polictes even Arctic 011 eould not yet
be competitively produced.

Current national and tnternettonal attItudes

re~erdtng

negl1F,ent or Intenttonel damage to the environment, combtned with only fragmentary knowledFe of the delicate
eoology of the Arctic, dictate the establishment of procedures ror the efrective prevention and control of potential pollution

probl~ms.
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In conformanoe with the Terr1torial Sea Convention of
1958 and

g~neral

internatIonal law, a right or. innocent

passage presently exists throughout the Northwest Passage.
Because of long-range national economic oonsiderations
and significant international implications the assertion
of 80vereigntr over the waters between the Canadian Arctic
Ielands would be detrimental to long-term Canadian Arctic
development.

In spite of atronf. domesttc

pr~88Urea

to the

contrary, responsible Canadian leadership .111 oonttnue to
reslst imposing restrictions beyond measures to control
polhltlon within the contiguous zone.
The Magnitude

or

proven 011 depo8ita alone have

8ignlflcantly altered the
Arcttc.

8trate~lc

importance of the

As systematic exploration, location and identifica-

tion of natural resource. progresse8 its Internattonal
strategic Importance wIll inorease In direct proportion to
the economic dependenee of individual nations on theee resources.

However, the severe environmental chal1enFes of

this "r.rontter" .t11 necessitate the cooperation of military, sclent! flc, technological end 1ndustri.al professionals
in order to optimize limited manpower and capt tal in the
realization of this economic potential.
Because or the multiplIcity of nattonal Inter-aFency
interests and broad internat10nal implications a unique
opportunl ty 18 prov1 ded for

Innov8t~ ons

5'7

1n coordinated

Arctio policy formulation and bilateral developmental planning.

Any sense

or

urgenoy which could lead to a narrowly

conceived or ultimately restrictive poltcy should be avoided
by

both the United States and Canada.

The potential rewards

or

an effective and mutually supporting arrangement are

olearly attainable.
Reoommendat1 ons:
As an interim measure pending a deoision by the petroleum industry regarding the tronsportat1on of 011 to the
Eaatern United States 1t is recommended that:
-

The role

or

the Inter-agenoy Arcttc Reaearoh

Ooordinating Oommittee be expanded,

8S

reoommended by

the Secretary of the Nevy, to inoorporate all ph.Rea of
ArctIc development planning and to monitor .tudies alreAdy
underwa,. to insure economy of effort.

'!'his committee

rep:reaents every existing Federal agenoy provtdl ng fundlny.
tor Arctic reaearoa and development.

Concurrently, these

eleven Federal agencies, with responsibilities for Arctic
.rrairs, should pursue the nine point program l outlined by
the Merine Sciences Council, under the coordination ot the
Arctic Coordinating Committee.

Additionally thftse agenct.s

should be encouraged to provide support end assistanoe, 8.
1

v.r!ne Science Affairs, January 1969. p. 145-146.
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practioable, to private industry 1n the resolution ot transportatton problema.
Aa a long term solutton to problema of ArctIc develop-

mentsl planning it 18 reoommended that:
-

The formation ot a bilateral -North American Arctic

Development Council" be proposed.

The U.S. ArctIc Researoh

Coordinating Committee and the Canadian Advisory Committee

on Northern Development could f"orm the nucleus of this
organlzllt1.on.

ChaIrmanship should be rotational as agreed

between the members.

'!'he f'unction of th1 e oouno11 would

be the atjmulat10n of both public and private tnveatment

through the resolution or mutual problems, the

coordinat~d

plann1ng of environmental researoh, resource looation,
identifioation and exploitation, improved trRnaportation
technology and support and defense systems development.

Thts body could eventually be expanded into

8

"R8~lonal

Aretio Development Counc11" to incorporate membership ot
all nations wIth an tnterest tn Arctic arfaire.
The decision of the petroleum Induatrr wIll have a
slgnifIoant lmpaot on the aFenda of the proposed organization.

Ir economic

~easlbl11ty

of eitner a surface or

sub-surface tanker system Is demonstrated, leading to the
planned

con8t1"U~tton

or shipa , early resolutlon or procedures

1'or pollut:l on control and plannlnp for development of support
system. wIll be required.

If, on the other hand, current
59

errorta are discarded in tlvor of a pipe-line eyatem future
dev~lopment

or commercial transportation within or through

the Northwest Passage wl11 be retarded.
ooordinated

plannln~

Nevertheless,

ror the eventual expansion of Inter-

nattonal trade wIll be required.

The proposed orpenlzatlon

can be tailored to requirements generated by the rate of
development yet prov1de the coordination essential to the

tntell1p,ent allocation or both publ!c and private resourcea.
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